A fading record of managerial choices
Major League Baseball managers have fewer visible ways to distinguish themselves than they once did. Sacrifice bunts and intentional walks have dwindled, while Baseball Prospectus has scaled back its once prominent effort to measure managerial decisions. The shift points to a game where strategic variation is harder to spot—and harder to quantify. It also raises a question about what counts as a manager’s signature when the familiar, easy-to-record choices appear less often.
Baseball Prospectus used to devote substantial attention to evaluating managers. Today, that work survives in a small section of its annual book, a detail colleague Patrick Dubuque recently noted. Steven Goldman, who helped bring manager commentary and statistics into the Annual years ago, took the remark personally at first. He also recognizes that Dubuque was right about the practice’s reduced place in the publication. The change isn’t just about page space: when a publication stops tracking a category at length, readers lose one organized account of how managers differ in that part of the job.
That reaction carries a familiar sting. An old contribution can disappear from institutional memory, even when no slight was intended. Goldman recalls that an editor named Steven introduced the material and valued it, and he misses that feature along with other parts of the past. But he says the present suits him better. Nostalgia can preserve the memory of a useful experiment; it can’t, by itself, make that experiment worth maintaining indefinitely.
The numbers show a narrower style
Managerial choices have become less varied on the field, too. This season, MLB teams attempted between nine sacrifice bunts, by the Tigers, and 45, by the Rays. That Tampa Bay total came largely down to Taylor Walls. The league average was 23 bunts, roughly one per team each week. Those figures describe a narrow slice of managing, but they make the decline tangible: the bunt is still available, yet it’s a much less common feature of a team’s regular approach.
The spread between the Tigers and Rays also shows why a league average can’t tell the whole story. A single team’s total can be shaped by a particular player, as Walls was for Tampa Bay, so the number shouldn’t be read as a pure measure of a manager’s philosophy. Still, the low totals across the league suggest that the tactic has less room to serve as a public marker of managerial identity. A decision that rarely occurs leaves fewer examples to compare.
Intentional walks were scarce as well. The Astros led with 41, while the Rockies and Twins each issued 10; the average was 18. Goldman describes the tactic as a weapon that can harm the team using it, and observes that even the Astros have embraced it far less than earlier managers might have. That tradeoff helps explain why the intentional walk is an unusually clear example of a manager’s choice: it can address one threat while putting another runner on base. But its visibility doesn’t make it representative of every decision a manager faces.
The contrast with baseball’s past is sharp. Gene Mauch once ordered 150 sacrifice bunts in a season, despite managing in a league with the designated hitter. Leo Durocher called for 75 intentional walks in a year. Those extremes belonged to a period when managers’ habits could be more conspicuous—and more distinct from one another. The raw totals don’t establish that the managers were better or worse. They show how much more often these particular tactics could define a team’s record of in-game choices.
What the change means for manager analysis
Fewer bunts and intentional walks don’t capture every part of a manager’s job. They do offer a visible measure of how much less often teams rely on certain discretionary tactics. When the range of those choices shrinks, the old project of cataloging each manager’s signature decisions loses some of its subject matter. This is more significant than it looks: what’s easiest to count can quietly shape what readers think management consists of.
That doesn’t erase the value of remembering how the game was managed, or the work that once tracked it. It does suggest that analysis has to follow the choices teams actually make. If you’re working in this space, the challenge is to distinguish a real change in managerial behavior from a change in which behaviors are easiest to observe. A smaller record of bunts and intentional walks doesn’t prove that managers have become interchangeable.
There’s still a record to build. It may concern decisions that draw less attention than a bunt sign or the four-fingered intentional walk, and that are harder to reduce to a single season total. The shift in tactics changes the evidence available to anyone comparing managers. Harder to see, harder to count.
Where the record goes next
Baseball Prospectus’s reduced coverage and the decline in these tactics point to a practical problem for baseball writing: a framework built around conspicuous decisions can become less useful as those decisions fade. That doesn’t mean the question of managerial difference has gone away. It means the answer may depend on paying closer attention to choices that don’t announce themselves as loudly.
And yet, there’s a limit to what the figures can tell us. They can show how often teams used bunts and intentional walks, and they can set current totals beside striking examples from the past. They can’t, on their own, explain every reason a manager made a choice or establish how much influence the manager had over a team’s broader approach. Here’s the thing: counts are valuable because they make patterns visible, but they’re only a starting point for explaining them.
For readers, the useful takeaway isn’t that the old style should return. It’s that the history of managerial analysis depends on what people choose to record, and those records can lose relevance as the game changes. Goldman’s mixed response captures the tension: a past project can matter and still belong to the past. The next account of managerial difference will have to earn its value by describing the game as it’s played now.