The Tampa Bay Rays’ approach makes a useful point about modern baseball: data can identify advantages, but it can’t turn every player into the same hitter or every game into the same pitching plan. The Rays and Milwaukee Brewers combined for four home runs in the World Series, the fewest in a Fall Classic since 1985. That low total made for an unusual series, not proof that analytics has run its course. A short run of games can draw attention to a style, but it offers limited evidence about whether that style is becoming more common across baseball.
When useful rules become habits
Baseball has official rules, of course, and a parallel set of customs: don’t steal with a big lead, don’t celebrate a home run too emphatically. The analytics era has its own conventions. Prioritize strikeouts on the mound. Treat batting average as secondary to on-base percentage. Avoid bunts and intentional walks.
These recommendations grew from a search for choices that tend to produce better results. A strikeout removes the chance that a ball in play will find a gap; reaching base without making an out gives an offense another chance to score. But a tendency that helps many teams can still be a poor fit for a particular player or situation. Baseball is played through individual matchups, and averages don’t settle every one of them.
Those ideas can be useful guides. They become a problem when teams mistake them for laws. The better question isn’t whether a club follows or rejects a trend. It’s whether its choices suit the players it has. Here's the thing: a strategy earns its place by helping a team win a specific contest, not by sounding modern or traditional.
Fit the plan to the player
For some hitters, pulling the ball in the air is an effective way to do damage. Johnny DeLuca, for example, posted a .429 slugging percentage despite underwhelming Statcast measures. That gap is a reminder that measured indicators and production don’t always line up neatly in a small sample or for an individual player. The numbers can help explain a hitter’s approach, but they don’t make the result inevitable.
The same hitting plan wouldn’t necessarily bring out the best in Chandler Simpson. A team that asks every hitter to chase the same ideal swing risks sanding away the skills that make some players useful. The harder work is deciding which parts of a broad model apply to the person at the plate, then judging whether the choice is paying off.
The Rays also showed that familiar pitching guidelines have limits. A third trip through the lineup generally carries a penalty, but Drew Rasmussen stayed in against the Yankees and Guardians for 71 total batters across three starts. That’s a reason to treat the rule as a warning, not an automatic instruction: a manager still has to weigh the pitcher’s performance, the opposing lineup, and the alternatives available in the bullpen.
If an ace is getting outs, the matchup rule doesn’t have to decide the move on its own. And yet, staying with a starter carries a cost when the opposing hitters have already seen him several times. The choice is a judgment call, with the general pattern providing useful context rather than a guaranteed answer.
Even the usual advice on changeups has room for judgment: they’re typically most effective against opposite-handed hitters, but a pitcher can use one against a same-handed batter if it works. A pitch’s reputation can guide a plan. The batter’s response should shape what happens next.
Small ball isn’t a verdict on analytics
The World Series’ low home-run count prompted talk that small ball had displaced the modern, power-focused game. Rob Mains argued that the series was an outlier, not evidence of a broad shift. That strikes me as the more persuasive read. Four home runs across one series make a striking headline, but the total alone can’t tell us whether teams across the league are changing their approach.
A short series can show what a team did well; it can’t, by itself, establish a new league-wide direction. Postseason results are especially easy to overread because a few games can make one tactic look decisive and another look obsolete. The sample is narrow, and the matchups are specific. This is more significant than it looks: resisting a sweeping conclusion is part of taking evidence seriously.
The Rays and Brewers made their players’ individual strengths count, even when those strengths didn’t match the era’s most popular templates. As Jarrett Seidler put it about Milwaukee: “I don’t think it’s so much that they’re zagging against pulled fly balls—this is the team that spent a first-round draft pick last year on Andrew Fischer—but that they are perfectly willing to maximize skill sets which just aren’t going to include that.”
The quote points to a distinction that can get lost in arguments about baseball’s next direction. A team can value power and still make room for players whose best contributions come another way. That isn’t a rejection of data; it’s an attempt to apply analysis to the roster in front of the club. Sometimes the edge is modest. Sometimes it’s the fit itself.
The value of staying flexible
That’s a more durable lesson than declaring one style of baseball the winner. Analytics can help teams identify patterns, challenge habits, and compare options. It can’t remove the need to decide when a general pattern fits the player and the moment.
If you’re working in this space, the practical question is whether a useful finding has become an unquestioned routine. A model may point toward a preferred choice, but a team still has to account for the individual skill, the opposing matchup, and what it can observe as the game unfolds (and this is the part most people overlook). Flexibility only matters when clubs keep checking whether their assumptions hold.
The Rays’ choices suggest that analytics works best as a way to find an edge, not a script every player must follow. Teams that keep testing their assumptions can adapt their plans to the talent in front of them—and keep finding value where conventional wisdom says to stop looking.
Not a universal formula.